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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Issues Presented 
1. WOULD THE FACTS, VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE 
TO MR. CARVELAS, PERMIT A REASONABLE FINDER OF FACT 
TO CONCLUDE THAT SUMMIT BREACHED ITS EMPLOYMENT 
AGREEMENT WITH HIM BY FAILING TO PAY HIM FULL 
BONUSES IN 2000 AND 2001? 
SeeRec.at68,79-81.1 
2. WOULD THE FACTS, VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE 
TO MR. CARVELAS, PERMIT A REASONABLE FINDER OF FACT 
TO CONCLUDE, EITHER BY CONSIDERATION OF EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE OR IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT PRINCIPLES, THAT 
SUMMIT BREACHED ITS EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WITH 
HIM BY FAILING TO PAY HIM A BONUS IN 2004? 
See Rec. at 68, 81-84. 
3. WOULD THE FACTS, VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE 
TO MR. CARVELAS, PERMIT A REASONABLE FINDER OF FACT 
TO CONCLUDE THAT SUMMIT BREACHED ITS EMPLOYMENT 
AGREEMENT WITH HIM BY FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE 
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS TO WHICH THE PARTIES HAD 
AGREED? 
See Rec. at 68, 85-87. 
1
 Citations in this form refer to the record marked pursuant to Utah R. App. 
P. 11(b)(2)(a). 
1 
B, Standard of Review 
The same standard of review applies to each issue presented in this appeal. 
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is 
inappropriate unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Francisconi v. Union Pac. R.R., 2001 UT App. 350, | 8, 
36 P.3d 999, 1002 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted). "On an appeal from a grant 
of summary judgment, [this Court] review[s] the trial court's legal conclusions for 
correctness and grant[s] them no deference." Francisconi, 2001 UT App. 350, f 8, 36 
P.3d at 1001-02 (citations and internal quotations omitted)). Thus, this Court considers 
"only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no 
disputed issues of material fact existed." Francisconi, 2001 UT App. 350, *f 8, 36 P.3d 
at 1002 (citation omitted). Finally, in making this determination, this Court also views 
"'the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
[Mr. Carvelas].'" Wood v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 2001 UT App. 35, t 6, 19 P.3d 
392, 395 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the 
appeal. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This is an appeal from a final order of Third Judicial District Court granting 
summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Summit Financial Resources, L.P. 
("Summit"), captioned as "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order," on all of 
claims filed by Plaintiff-Appellant Donald J. Carvelas. Rec. at 133-45 (Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (entered Nov. 29, 2005) (hereinafter cited as 
"Order") (copy attached as Addendum A to this Brief). In his Complaint, Mr. Carvelas 
has alleged that Summit breached an employment agreement between him and Summit 
when Summit failed to pay him full bonuses due in 2000 and 2001; when Summit failed 
to pay him any bonus in 2004; and when Summit failed to comply with the procedural 
requirements stated in their agreement when it terminated his employment in 2005. 
Rec. at 3-6, 7-8 (Complaint at pp. 3-6, ffif 8-20, and p. 7, ffif 25-31). Summit declined to 
conduct discovery and, instead, filed a motion for summary judgment. See Rec. at 73 
n.2. In its Order granting summary judgment, the District Court concluded that, under 
the unambiguous terms of the parties' agreement, Summit was not obligated to pay full 
bonuses to Mr. Carvelas in 2001 and 2002, was not obligated to pay him any bonus in 
2004, and complied with the procedural requirements of the agreement when it 
terminated him in 2005. Rec. at 134-35 (Order at pp. 2-3, ffl[ 7, 12) (Addendum A). 
3 
B. Statement of Facts 
Suinni.it, a fi.nancl.al services company, entered ' : written Employment 
Agic\ Septembi - > (Employment 
Agreement dated Sept. 15, 1999 (uic u,iii]v-\, ... *. Agreement" \ m i 1) (. i;( , ta« :ih,.< : i 1 , is 
Adderuhim B to this Brief)); Rec. A\ ^ i \ffidavit ol (iordo's (> 1 al I aye dated July 27, 
* v Invprnin ' \h }JMI ? 
The Employment Agreement contains the fbllowing language governing the 
payment I*J ; onuses during Mr. Carvelas' employment with Summit up to the year 
I Jpon execution of this agreement the Employee will, be paid a one time 
bonus ( >f Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000) [The figure, "1.2,000," is 
crossed out and "12,500" written next to it, with initials approving the 
change.] 
Based upon the Employee's completion of all or substantially all of the 
Annual Performance Objectives as determined by the Company's Chief 
Executive Officer and as set forth in Exhibit B as they may be revised, 
modified or amended pursuant to Paragraph 3 above, the Employee 
shall accrue an annual bonus in the amount of (1) Ten Percent (10%) of 
his base salary for the period ending December 31, 1999 on a prorata 
basis; (2) Fifteen Percent (15%) of his base salary for the period ending 
December 31, 2000; (3) Twenty Percent (20%) of his base salary for the 
period ending December 31, 2001; and (4) Twenty Percent (20%) of his 
base salary for the period ending December 31, 2002, Payment of annual 
bonus compensation to the Employee will be made not later than April 
15th of the fiscal year following each bonus period. 
Rec. at 89 (Employment Agreement i it p 2, <f 4.2) (emphasis added) (Addendum 13;. 
Agreement thus makes Exhibit -> .peulically appu^olc t-~ *M 
payment of bonuses to the payment of bom ises in -l 
way, the Agreement makes the payment of all annual bonuses contingent upon the 
completion of all or substantially all of the Annual Performance Objectives as 
determined by Summit's Chief Executive Officer "and as set forth in Exhibit B as they 
may be revised, modified or amended pursuant to Paragraph 3 ...." 
Exhibit B, in turn, requires the parties to establish initial goals and objectives that 
"may be later revised, modified or amended pursuant to paragraph 3" Exhibit B states 
as follows: 
EXHIBIT B 
The following goals and objectives are set for the performance of 
Donald J. Carvelas ("Employee") in the capacity of Vice President, 
Underwriting of ALTRES Financial, L.P. ("Company"). 
The successful completion of all or substantially all of these terms 
will entitle the Employee to receive a cash bonus equal to Ten Percent 
(10%) of Employee's base pay to be payable not later than April 15, 2000. 
The Company's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") or designee will 
conduct a formal review of Employee's performance on or before 
January 31, 2000. In the event this review does not take place by 
January 31, 2000, Employee will be deemed to have successfully 
completed all or substantially all of the required goals and objectives. 
In the event Employee does not achieve all or substantially all of 
the goals and objectives, the CEO or designee may reduce the percentage 
of the cash bonus paid to the Employee. 
Goals and Objectives 
To be determined and mutually agreed upon not later than 
August 31,1999. 
Rec. at 100 (Employment Agreement, Exhibit B, at p. 1) (emphasis added) (Addendum 
B). As this language makes clear, Exhibit B to the Employment Agreement requires the 
parties to determine and mutually agree upon an initial set of goals and objections. 
5 
Exhibit B provides for the payment of a bonus, requires the CEO to conduct an annual 
review, provides that a bonus will be paid if lhe> do h.*t conduct the annual review, and 
permits the < reduce a cash bonut employee does not meet all or 
substantially mKth^ .c- ' objectives. Further, although paragraph -I of the 
Agreement (which we quoted just prior to Exhibit B above) makes the requirements of 
Exhibit B applicable to the payment . i bonuses, exhibit i> ; h ^ uso contains some 
language immediately preceding IIJ.», ( > 
wha t happens w h e n an annual rev iew is not conducted pr ior to January 1, 2000 . 
Paragraph 3 of the Employment Agreement , however , appears te Harify this 
an ibigi iit> , stating as folio w s: 
Dut ies . Employee shall be the V ice President , \ ^ k - r w r r u i u . of the 
company. Employee shall diligently execute such duties and shall devote 
his full-time skills and efforts to such duties dur ing ordinary work ing 
hours. Employee shall be responsible for performing his duties in 
compliance with the accountabilities in the Job Description set forth in 
Exhibit A and for accomplishing the annual Performance Objectives 
set forth in Exhibit B, attached hereto respectively. Employee 
acknowledges that such Goals and Objectives are subject to annual 
review, modification, and amendment in tlu» discretion of the Chief 
Executive Officer to reflect changes in performance criteria, and that 
such updated Goals and Objectives shall constitute a part q f this 
Agreement 
Rec. at 88 (Employment Agreement at p. 1 ,^3) (emphasis and double emphasis added) 
(Addendum B). As this language makes clear, the Employment Agreement makes the 
annui il Perf< >rn la on ;< • Objectives \ ;< ;t ft n th ii l E KI Ill it B \ •  t : I i l 1 he Employment 
Agreement universally applicable to the determination of those mm lal borm-s^-
Employment Agreement also thus provides that the annual Performance Objectives set 
forth in Exhibit B - which Exhibit B required the parties to establish initially by mutual 
agreement - would be subject to annual review, modification and amendment, and that 
such updated Goals and Objectives would also be part of the Agreement. 
The Factual Question Whether Any Goals and Objectives Ever Existed 
The record is entirely devoid of any goals and objectives that either the parties 
established initially by mutual agreement or that Mr. LaHaye later reviewed, modified, 
or amended. Specifically, the record shows that the parties never established an initial 
set of goals and objectives as required by Exhibit B, that Summit never conducted a 
formal review of Mr. Carvelas throughout his entire tenure at Summit at which any new 
goals and objective were established, and that Summit never informed him of any 
"review," "modification," or "amendment" to the initial goals and objectives (that were 
never established). Rec. at 102 (Affidavit of Donald J. Carvelas dated Aug. 16, 2005 
("Carvelas Aff") \ 4 (attached as Addendum D to this Brief)). 
The only evidence of record that Mr. LaHaye ever established any goals or 
objectives - contrary to the requirements of Exhibit B that the parties establish initial 
goals and objectives by mutual agreement - consists entirely of the post-termination 
assertions set forth in his Affidavit submitted in support of Summit's motion for 
summary judgment. No record of any goals or objectives, as initially established or as 
later reviewed, modified, or amended by Mr. LaHaye, was ever filed with the District 
Court. Instead, Mr. LaHaye asserted that, "[fjor the year 2000, it was determined that 
no employee, including Mr. Carvelas, fully met their individual and collective goals and 
7 
^ ivi M r. inancial d 
honu • • *- *-* base »alar\ Carvela> -<:. , - ?0 H.aHavc \fi * •) 
(,/ Addendum C) I" lit I -al laye also asserted that, "[f|or the year 2001, it was determined 
Ih.il iu> eittplouv. 11 u liidifi!" Mi "fjnch Ii.ul mil lliui iiitln i<hul ""<1 i 11| U >i f i \«' p y ! s 
and objectives, and therefore Summit Financial paid no bonuses." Rec. at 62 (LaHaye 
AW tr c^  (Addendum r^ Despite the absence of any record of any such goals or 
1
 e i -l * I >• • ! i i - u j- * > s 
true and repeated them as findings of fact in its Order granting summary judgment. Rec. 
at 134 (Order at p. 2, f 1( 5) (Addendum A). Tliere is also no record of any goals or 
objectiv es ha\ liig be en e stall: lis! led fc i 2:002 Nonetheless, . ,.i\ J a s received a 
bonus equal to 20% of his base salary for the year 2002. Durim • " * • • • ) 
never given a formal review or notice of any performance goals and objectives that 
applied to hin i Rec at 102 (Carvelas Aff ! If 8 ) 0 Addendum D). 
Extrinsic Evidence of the 
The Employment Agreement contains no language addressing whether Summit 
will pay bonuses beyond 2002 and, if so, applying what methodology to calculate them. 
Rathe , r 
which bonuses would be calculated with the year 2002. Rec. at 89 (Employment 
Agreement at p. 2) (Addendum B). 
• Disci issions be tw ee i I il'\ fi Car \ relas and "h lit LaHaye during negotiation the 
Employment Agreement, however, reflect the parties' intention 
8 
before Mr. Carvelas was hired by Summit during or around September 1999, 
Mr. Carvelas and Mr. LaHaye discussed the terms of the Employment Agreement and, 
in particular, the bonus provisions of the Agreement. During that discussion, 
Mr. La Haye told Mr. Carvelas that bonuses would continue to be paid to management 
staff, including Mr. Carvelas, beyond 2002, based on the requirements set forth in the 
Agreement and using the same calculation as that used in 2002. Rec. at 102 (Carvelas 
Aff. If 6) (Addendum D). Based on this discussion, Mr. Carvelas understood, at the time 
he entered into the Employment Agreement with Summit, that Summit would continue, 
beyond 2002, to pay bonuses based on the requirements set forth in the Employment 
Agreement and arriving at the bonuses in the same way that Summit arrived at the 
bonuses paid for 2002. Rec. at 102 (Carvelas Aff. % 7) (Addendum D). 
This understanding by Mr. Carvelas was confirmed by Mr. LaHaye again during 
2003. In particular, during January 2003, Mr. La Haye again represented to 
Mr. Carvelas that, after 2002 (the period as to which the Employment Agreement is 
silent), Summit would continue to pay Mr. Carvelas annual bonuses based on the 
percentage applicable to the year 2002. Rec. at 103 (Carvelas Aff. Tf 9) (Addendum D). 
This representation confirmed Mr. Carvelas' understanding that Summit would continue 
to pay bonuses to Mr. Carvelas equal to 20% of his base salary for each year of his 
employment following 2002. Rec. at 103 (Carvelas Aff. If 10) (Addendum D). 
This understanding by Mr. Carvelas was again confirmed through the parties' 
course of conduct after 2002. In particular, Summit did in fact pay Mr. Carvelas a 
9 
bonus equal to 20% of his base salary for the year 2003. Rec. at 103 (Carvelas Aff. 
<f 11) (Addendum D) The payment of the bonus at that rate for 2003 again confirmed to 
Carvelas tl lat Summit would continue to pay annual bonuses for each; year of his 
emploj ment at the same rale as I he rate established in the Employment \ greement for 
the year 2002. Rec. at 103 (Carvelas Aff. ^ 12) (Addendum D). 
7 In " 7 ermination of Mr. Carvelas" Employment 
I 111 I I 11 in |) I i hi in i nl Atu'irinrnl pnnnlcs ill in! Mini I .ini'liis" nit fill'in i i ini l nnuli l i : 
"at will" subject to certain procedural requirements specified in the Agreement. The 
Agreement provides: 
I he Company agrees to employ Employee and Employee agrees to accept 
employment with the Company on at "at will" basis. The employee 
acknowledges that the Company may terminate his employment for any 
reason at any time, subject to the requirements of subparagraphs 6.2, 6.3, 
and 6.4 below to the extent that those provisions are applicable to the 
employee's termination. 
R ec • at 88 (Emplo) n lent A gi een le i it at j: 1) (c i nphasis adde d) ( \ <\<W 
Paragraphs 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, in turn, address "Termination of Employee for 
Cause," " rermination of Employee without Cause," and "Termination for Disability," 
rcspeUnrb llh'n ill *' ' ' i f i'liiploMiienl Aj'jvunenl I .ill | i | n "'I || n» J" in \ mil ii II 
(Addendum B). Paragraph 6.3, which is relevant to this case, states, in pertinent part as 
follows: 
1 ermination of Employee without Cause. I he Company may terminate 
Employee other than for "cause" upon written notice to the employee. 
Such notice shall contain a statement of the grounds therefore 
Rec. at 93 (Employment Agreement at p. 6, f 6.3) (emphasis added) (Addendum B). 
The Employment Agreement states, as a distinct requirement, that a notice of 
termination without cause contain a statement of the "grounds therefore," which can 
reasonably be read either as requiring a statement of a reason or, as the Defendant does, 
a statement that the termination was "without cause." 
During a meeting among Mr. Carvelas on April 6, 2005, Mr. La Haye, and Doug 
Keefe, who was Summit's Chief Financial Officer, Mr. La Haye informed Mr. Carvelas 
that, if he did not resign, his employment would be terminated. Mr. Carvelas declined 
to resign and Mr. La Haye informed Mr. Carvelas that his employment was being 
terminated without cause. Rec. at 103 (Carvelas Aff. f 13) (Addendum D). During that 
meeting, Mr. Carvelas asked Mr. La Haye a number of times why he was being 
terminated and his response, each time Mr. Carvelas asked, was that Mr. Carvelas' 
employment was at will and, under Utah law, he did not need to give a reason. Rec. at 
104 (Carvelas Aff. f 14). Mr. Carvelas then returned to his office, along with 
Mr. Keefe, Mr. Keefe gave Mr. Carvelas an envelope containing a letter from 
Mr.LaHaye dated April 6, 2005 letter notifying him of his termination. The letter stated 
the following: 
You are hereby notified that your employment with Summit Financial 
Resources, L.P. is terminated effective immediately. Your Employment 
Agreement dated September 15, 1999 and the Summit Financial 
Resources, L.P. Employee Policy Manual (Revised 2004) provide that 
your employment is "at will" and may be terminated for any reason, 
with or without cause, at any time. The company is therefore exercising 
its right to terminate you without cause.... 
11 
Rec. at 105 (notice of termination dated April 6, 2005 (attached as Addendum E to this 
Brief)) (emphasis added). Thus, although the Employment Agreement required that a 
the April 65 2005 letter failed to identify any grounds or reason. Mr. Keefe likewise told 
Carvelas that the termination was without cause and that there were absolutely no 
performance issues or wrongdoing of any kind being claimed by Summit. Rec. at 103 
Carvelas for the keys to his office, said that his personal belongings would be 
packed up, and added that those items would either be sent to Mr. Carvelas' apartment 
• : i 1 i ;:: • :>oi l id si c • : ffice ; t le n :i R ;» c at 10 Il- (Can elas \ ff 1 [ 16) 
(Addendum D). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
liul "I mill i in ill in t»i«uill!it» siimnun |IHI}>IIICIII In Siuiiiiiiiiill I his case 
requires a determination of the intent oi the parties as to the meaning of ambiguous 
terms contained in their Employment Agreement. This analysis necessarily requires a 
taking
 ay f a c j s in a Ught most tavor arvelas 
and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, preclude summan uidm-i -v i 
reasonable finder of fact could conclude that Summit failed to satisfy its obligation 
under the tei ms of the parties' written Employment Agreement to pay full bonuses to 
either by consideration of extrinsic evidence as to the parties' intent or by application of 
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implied-in-fact contract principles, that Summit failed to satisfy its obligation under the 
Employment Agreement to pay him a bonus in 2004. Third, a reasonable finder of fact 
could also conclude that Summit breached the Employment Agreement by failing to 
satisfy the procedural requirements set forth in their Employment Agreement for 
terminating an employee without cause. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A REASONABLE FINDER OF FACT COULD CONCLUDE THAT 
SUMMIT BREACHED ITS WRITTEN CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
WITH MR. CARVELAS BY FAILING TO PAY HIM FULL BONUSES IN 
2000 AND 2001. 
The District Court concluded that, by paying Mr. Carvelas a partial bonus in 
2000 and no bonus in 2001, Summit fulfilled its obligations under the Employment 
Agreement. Rec. at 134-35 (Order at p. 2, ffl| 2-5 and p. 3, Tf 12) (Addendum A). The 
District Court started with the premise that the determination "[w]hether or not 
Mr. Carvelas met the goals and objectives of his employment was within the sole 
discretion" of Mr. LaHaye. Rec. at 134-35 (Order at pp. 2-3, H 8) (Addendum A). The 
District Court then made the factual finding, relying solely on the assertion made by 
Mr. LaHaye after the filing of this civil action, that no employee, including 
Mr. Carvelas, had met his goals and objectives for 2000 and 2001; and, based on that 
determination, concluded that Summit did not breach the parties' Agreement by paying 
Mr. Carvelas only a partial bonus in 2000 and no bonus in 2001. Rec. at 134 (Order at 
p. 2, fflf 4, 5) (Addendum A). 
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A . 1 'he F Mure to Establish Any Initial Goals . - . objectives Precluded 
Mr. LaHaye From Ever Reviewing, Modifying, or Amending Any Such 
Goals and Objectives, and, Therefore, from Making a Determination 
Whether Mr. Carvelas Met Them. 
M i l 1 h i III 1 ( 1 I M i l l I t '•l-*< l l l l l l f . 1 IH l l l l l l ' i t i l l l S S l l i l l . i l t i l l l i l ' I i l I I I I In . ' LAJIJilIIM HI lllIlUH, 
for Mr. LaHaye to liave made a determination whether Mr. Carvelas had met the goals 
and objectives of his employment, there had to have been goals and objectives for 
I Ill' ! ".niveitis in nited ni HI mil i oi'iii Indeed1, paragraph M _ . . •: iployment Agreement 
provides that payment of bonuses for 1999 through 2002 woi lid 1 >c ba sed on 
" ' Carvelas' completion of the annual performance objectives as "as determined by the 
Company s i :: L \ Executive Officer and as set t. , *, , xhibit B as they max ?x < vt \t-J, 
modified ; mended pin .ii.ml I" I'IIMJ.* • i • t 
Agreement at * * ') (emphasis added) (Addendum B).
 Oxopi: J , .:. .uin, 
provides that Mi. < at vcia^ was responsible "for accomplishing the annual Performance 
Obje< • ' ;il 88 (En iplo> ment \ gi eement at p ) 
(emphasis added) (Addendum B). Exhibit B, then, required the parties to establish an 
initial set of goals and objectives, something they never did, leaving Mr. LaHaye 
i n i l l in i l l1 1 I n i ' i " \ i p v \ M I I M I J I mi' .I in it i in Il .I in in ill II Jill I ", in., r l a s mi Il II mini], Il 11 K , \ III mi n o l i mini . e l 
Thus, on the record before this Court, and taking all facts in a light most favorable to 
Mr. Carvelas and drawing all justifiable inferences in his favor, a reasonable finder of 
I.ii "il mild in,ill Iilli! liKiuul de te rmina t ion that n o such goa l s a n d objec t ives ever exis ted. 
Therefore, the jury could also conclude as a facti lal n latte i tl: .at IN li I al la.) e's asser tion 
that Mr. Carvelas did not meet those requirements is a mere post-lawsuit fabrication for 
an employment action that did not comply with the terms of the Employment 
Agreement. 
B. The Failure of Mr. LaHaye to Ever Conduct a Formal Review of 
Mr. Carvelas Required Summit, By Operation of the Language of 
Exhibit B, to Pay Full Bonuses in Each Year. 
A reasonable jury, as an alternative to reaching the conclusion addressed above, 
could also make the factual determination that the parties intended all of the language of 
Exhibit B to apply to the annual payment of bonuses, not just the language contained in 
Exhibit B under the heading, "Goals and Objectives" that requires the parties to 
establish an initial set by mutual agreement. Specifically, Exhibit B provides that "[t]he 
Company's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") or designee will conduct a formal review 
of Employee's performance on or before January 31, 2000. In the event this review 
does not take place by January 31, 2000, Employee will be deemed to have successfully 
completed all or substantially all of the required goals and objectives." Rec. at 100 
(Employment Agreement, Exhibit B, at p. 1) (Addendum B). Although this provision 
contains language that refers only to a review to be conduct on or before January 31, 
2000, one could reasonably interpret this provision as the place in the Employment 
Agreement that explains the parties' obligations concerning not only the initial 
establishment of goals but also annual reviews and the consequences of failing to 
conduct an annual review in each year. In fact, as we have seen, the language of 
paragraphs 3 and 4.2 of the Employment Agreement specifically makes Exhibit B 
applicable to the payment of bonuses in 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. Thus, in the 
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apparent ambiguity between the language in Exhibit B that refers only to the obligation 
to conduct an annual review in one year and the language of paragraphs 3 and 4.2 that 
makes Exhibit B applicable to every year, a reasonable jury would be fully justified in 
concluding that Exhibit B tells us what happens when, as here, Mr. Carvelas was never 
given a review. In these circumstances, a reasonable jury could conclude, he is deemed 
by operation of Exhibit B, to have successfully completed all or substantially all of the 
required goals and objectives. 
Summit, for its part, may say that the language quoted above from Exhibit B can 
only apply to the year 1999 because the language refers specifically only to conducting a 
formal review on or before January 31, 2000. Yet, "[a] contract provision is ambiguous 
if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of 'uncertain 
meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.'" Fair bourn 
Commercial Inc. v. Am. Hous. Prtnrs, Inc., 2004 UT 54, % 10, 94 P.3d 292 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2004) (quoting Winegar v. Froerer, 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991) (quoting, in 
turn, Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983)); R&R Energies v. 
Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 313 Utah Adv. 33, 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997) 
(language in a contract is "ambiguous" when it is reasonably capable of being 
understood in more than one sense). In light of the language of paragraphs 3 and 4.2 of 
the Employment Agreement (making Exhibit B applicable to the annual payment of 
bonuses in every year), the language contained in Exhibit B that refers to the year 2000 
annual review merely makes these provisions governing the payment of bonuses capable 
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of more than one interpretation. As a result, the question whether all of the provisions 
of Exhibit B apply to the payment of all annual bonuses described in paragraphs 3 and 
4.2 - telling us what happens when the CEO fails to conduct an annual review in each 
year - is not capable of resolution on a motion for summary judgment. Instead, taking 
the facts in a light most favorable to the Mr. Carvelas and drawing all justifiable 
inferences in his favor, as we must, it is clear that the question whether Mr. Carvelas' 
understanding as to the import of Exhibit B on the failure to conduct an annual review in 
any given year is the correct one presents an issue of material fact that precludes 
summary judgment. Id; Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 1293 (stating that "a motion for summary 
judgment may not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists in 
the contract and there is a factual issue as to what the parties intended"); Webb v. R.OA. 
General Inc., 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (stating that 6"[o]nly when 
contract terms are complete, clear, and unambiguous can they be interpreted by the 
judge on a motion for summary judgment'") (citation omitted). 
C. Even if Mr. LaHaye Had Sole Discretion to Establish Goals and 
Objectives and Determine Whether Mr. Carvelas Met Themy There 
Exists a Factual Dispute as to Whether He Ever Established Any Goals 
and Objectives On Which to Base Such a Determination. 
Even if Mr. LaHaye had sole discretion to determine whether Mr. Carvelas had 
met the applicable goals and objectives (as the District Court concluded), summary 
judgment would still be inappropriate., Specifically, even if a jury were not fully 
justified in making either of the two factual determinations addressed above, there exists 
the factual question of whether Mr. LaHaye had actually ever even considered that 
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Mr. Carvelas had failed to meet applicable goals and objectives. Indeed, Mr. LaHaye 
could not have made that determination, if no such goals and objectives were ever 
established. In light of Summit's failure to produce any evidence of any established 
goals and objectives except for Mr. La Haye's post-lawsuit assertion, a reasonable jury 
would be fully justified in making the factual determination that there simply were none 
and that Mr. La Haye's assertion now that Mr. Carvelas failed to meet them is a 
fabrication. In the context of Summit's current motion, the absence of any documentary 
evidence or any annual review of Mr. Carvelas' performance, at the very least, creates 
issues of fact as to the truthfulness of Mr. La Haye's assertions, precluding summary 
judgment. See, e.g., Pryor v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 212 F.3d 976, 
979-80 (7th Cir. 2000) (reversing summary judgment on plaintiffs claim of unlawful 
retaliation, emphasizing the fact that the attorney criticizing the plaintiffs work had 
failed to document any of the post-termination criticisms). 
Finally, even if Summit had actually produced evidence in support of its motion 
showing that such goals existed and that Mr. Carvelas failed to meet them, the 
Defendant's motion would have been premature. Now, prior to discovery, is not the 
appropriate time to resolve the factual issue whether Mr. Carvelas actually met those 
goals. Without an opportunity to discover either the existence or non-existence of any 
standards actually established back in 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002, we cannot say, as a 
matter of fact, that Mr. Carvelas failed to meet those standards. See, e.g., Fisher v. 
Pharmacis & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 921-22 (8th Cir. 2000) (reversing the grant of 
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summary judgment to a defendant where the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence 
that he met the defendant's legitimate expectations; and finding that a poor performance 
evaluation may have been a contrived effort to justify the plaintiffs demotion). 
Mr. Carvelas should be given the opportunity to show that Mr. LaHaye's rationale for 
not paying full bonuses to him in 2000 and 2001 is false. See, e.g., Cicero v. Borg-
Warner Automotive, Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 589-93 (6th Cir. 2001) (lack of evidence 
establishing the plaintiffs asserted poor performance, coupled with a lack of 
contemporaneous criticism, would allow a fact finder to conclude that the proffered 
reason for the plaintiffs discharge had no basis in fact). The District Court thus erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Summit on the issue whether Summit breached 
its obligation to Mr. Carvelas by paying him only a partial bonus in 2000 and no bonus 
in 2001. 
II. A REASONABLE FINDER OF FACT COULD CONCLUDE, EITHER BY 
CONSIDERATION OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OR IMPLIED-IN-FACT 
CONTRACT PRINCIPLES, THAT SUMMIT BREACHED ITS 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WITH MR. CARVELAS BY FAILING 
TO PAY HIM A BONUS IN 2004. 
The District Court was wrong to conclude that the Employment Agreement 
"provides for no bonuses after December 2002, and there is no ambiguity in that 
language." Rec. at 135 (Order at p. 3, \ 10) (Addendum A). In fact, rather than actually 
containing any language that provides for either permitting or prohibiting the payment 
of bonuses after 2002, as the District Court concluded, the Employment Agreement is 
completely silent on the question whether Summit has such an obligation. Plainly, 
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silence in an agreement is not the equivalent of a prohibition; rather, missing terms 
create ambiguity. See, e.g., Fairbourn, 2004 UT 54, f 10, 34 P.3d at 295 (stating that 
"contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies'") (citations omitted); Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2000 UT 37, ffl[ 8-10, 78 P.3d 
600, 602-03 (Utah 2003) (concluding that, because a lease agreement was silent on the 
question of payment for improvements, the lease was ambiguous on that issue; but 
finding the contract unenforceable due to a lack of extrinsic evidence on that issue). 
Thus, in light of this lack of completeness, the Employment Agreement is plainly 
ambiguous on the question whether Mr. Carvelas was entitled to the payment of such a 
bonus in 2004. See, e.g., Id.; Webb, 804 P.2d at 551. Accordingly, in resolving the 
apparent ambiguity as to whether the parties intended bonuses to continue beyond 2002 
or, as Summit contends, end there for the duration of Mr. Carvelas' employment, we can 
properly rely on extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent at the time they 
entered into the Employment Agreement or, alternatively, on implied-in-fact contract 
principles to give effect to the intention manifested by the parties' after the specific 
provisions of the Agreement were no longer operable. 
A. Extrinsic Evidence Establishes that the Parties Intended that the 
Payment of Bonuses Would Continue Beyond 2002 Based on the 
Methodology Set Forth in the Employment Agreement. 
The Defendant asserted below (Mem. at pp. 7 and 9) that, because the 
Employment Agreement specifically provides for the payment of bonuses through 2002, 
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the Court should not consider parol or other extrinsic evidence as to whether the parties 
intended the payment of bonuses to continue beyond 2002 as annual bonuses for the 
duration of Mr. Carvelas' tenure. In reaching its conclusion that the parties' 
Employment Agreement "provides for no bonuses after December 2002, and there is no 
ambiguity in that language," the District Court implicitly adopted the Defendant's 
assertion. As we show below, however, that reasoning is fallacious. The Employment 
Agreement was not integrated on the question whether bonuses would continued beyond 
2002 and extrinsic evidence helps resolve the ambiguity whether bonuses would 
continue beyond that year. 
1. The Employment Agreement Was Not Integrated on the 
Question Whether Bonuses Would Continue Beyond 2002. 
The parol evidence rule is the appropriate starting point for our inquiry. The 
parol evidence rule is a substantive rule of contract construction, not a rule of evidence, 
that '"operates in the absence of fraud to exclude [prior and] contemporaneous 
conversations, statements, or representations offered for the purpose of varying or 
adding to the terms of an integrated contract.'" Novell, Inc. v. Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 
UT App. 162, % 10, 92 P.3d 768, 772 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted). "'An 
agreement is integrated where the parties thereto adopt a writing or writings as the final 
and complete expression of the agreement.'" Id. (citation omitted). Yet, contracts may 
be only partially integrated. Novell, 2004 UT App. 162, f 15, 92 P.3d at 773. This court 
has stated: 
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"Parol evidence not inconsistent with the writing is admissible to show 
what the contract really was, by supplementing, as distinguished from 
contradicting, the writing. In such a case parol evidence to prove the part 
not reduced to writing is admissible, although it is not admissible as to the 
part reduced to writing." 
Id. (quoting Webb, 804 P.2d at 551). Parol evidence is thus admissible when, as here, 
such evidence is used to establish the part of the agreement not reduced to writing. 
The record on appeal here would in fact permit a reasonable jury to conclude that 
the parties did not intend the Employment Agreement to be integrated on the issue of 
payment of bonuses beyond 2002. The parties' written Employment Agreement merely 
states that "[t]his Agreement constitutes the full and complete understanding and 
agreement of the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter covered herein and 
supersedes all prior oral or written understandings and agreements with respect thereto." 
Rec. at 96 (Employment Agreement at p. 9) (Addendum B). Yet, the Agreement is 
entirely silent on the question whether bonuses would be paid beyond 2002 and for the 
remainder of Mr. Carvelas' career with Summit, however long that may have been. 
Accordingly, in addressing the payment of bonuses, the phrase, "the subject matter 
covered herein" is reasonably susceptible of being interpreted as either applying only to 
the payment of bonuses through 2002, or, as Summit would urge, covering the payment 
of bonuses throughout the entire employment relationship. As a consequence, the 
question whether the Agreement is integrated on the payment of bonuses only through 
2002 or throughout the entire employment relationship is a question of fact for the jury 
to resolve. See, e.g., Webb, 804 P.2d at 551 (stating that "'[o]nly when contract terms 
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are complete, clear, and unambiguous can they be interpreted by the judge on a motion 
for summary judgment"'). In light of the record before the Court, taking all facts in a 
light most favorable to Mr. Carvelas and drawing all justifiable inferences in his favor, a 
reasonable jury could conclude that the agreement was not integrated on that issue and, 
as we show in the next section, ambiguous. 
2. Extrinsic Evidence Helps Resolve the Ambiguity Reflected in 
the Employment Agreement As to Whether Bonuses Would Be 
Paid After 2002. 
Even when a contract is integrated such that the parol evidence rule precludes the 
admission of extrinsic evidence to contradict the terms of the written contract, extrinsic 
evidence is admissible to clarify the meaning of the contract when the integrated 
contract contains a term that is ambiguous. See, e.g., Novell, 2004 UT Ap. 162, f 15 
n. 3, 92 P.3d at 773. "'Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, which [this 
Court] review[s] for correctness." Cannon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 2000 UT App. 10, 
U 16, 994 P.2d 824, 827 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000); see also 
Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, % 12, 62 P.3d 440, 442 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). The 
court must first make a preliminary determination of ambiguity, and in doing so, may 
consider "relevant, extrinsic evidence ' of the facts known to the parties at the time they 
entered the [contract]."5 Nielsen, 2003 UT 37, f 7, 78 P.3d at 601 (quoting Yeargin, Inc. 
v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 11, f 39, 20 P.3d 287, 297 (Utah 
2001)) (second alteration in original)). Thus, to determine whether a contract term is 
ambiguous, a court is not limited to the four-comers of the document itself; rather, the 
23 
court may look to all the attendant circumstances surrounding the execution of the 
document: 
"Rational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all 
credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties ... so that the 
court can place itself in the same situation in which the parties found 
themselves at the time of contracting. If after considering such evidence 
the court determines that the interpretations contended for are reasonably 
supported by the language of the contract, then extrinsic evidence is 
admissible to clarify the ambiguous terms." 
Novell 2004 UT Ap. 162, fflf 15 n. 3, 92 P.3d at 774 (quoting Ward v. Intermountain 
Farmers Assoc, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) (internal quotes and citation omitted)). 
"Therefore, in considering a motion for summary judgment, 'failure to resolve an 
ambiguity by determining the parties' intent from parol evidence is error.'" WebBank v. 
Am. Gen. Annuity Service Corp., 2002 UT 88, t 22, 54 P.3d 1139, 1145 (Utah 2002) 
(quoting SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 201 UT 
54,114, 28 P.3d 669, 675 (Utah 2001)) (further citation omitted). 
The Employment Agreement here is, without question, ambiguous on the 
question whether bonuses would be paid, and on what terms, beyond 2002. In fact, as 
we have seen, the Agreement is entirely silent on the question whether the parties 
intended bonuses to continue beyond the years specifically enumerated in the 
Agreement or, alternatively, end there. In light of such silence, the Agreement is 
susceptible of reasonable alternative interpretations yielding contrary conclusions. See, 
e.g., Nielsen, 2000 UT 37, ffif 8-10, 78 P.3d at 602-03. Accordingly, the Court may 
consider the testimony of Mr. Carvelas as well as the parties' actions and performance 
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as evidence of their true intentions. See, e.g., Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State 
Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted); Winegar, 590 
P.2d at 350. In fact, such evidence establishes that, at the time Mr. Carvelas entered into 
the Agreement, he reasonably understood that bonuses would continue past 2002; that 
Mr. La Haye represented to Mr. Carvelas in January 2003 that bonuses would continue 
at 20% of his salary beyond 2002; and that, in fact, Summit paid Mr. Carvelas a bonus 
equal to 20% of his salary in 2003. Thus, on the record before the Court on appeal, and 
taking all facts in a light most favorable to Mr. Carvelas and drawing all justifiable 
inferences in his favor, a reasonable jury could conclude that the parties intended 
bonuses to continue beyond 2002 and that such bonuses would be calculated using the 
methodology set forth in the Employment Agreement. See WebBank, 2002 UT 88, ^ f 22, 
54P.3dat l l45. 
In response to all of this, Summit may say that it disputes the assertions made by 
Mr. Carvelas concerning the intent of the parties. Yet, when there is such a dispute 
about the material extrinsic evidence bearing on the meaning of a provision, there exists 
a dispute of material fact for the jury to resolve. Francisconi, 2001 UT App. 350, f 14, 
36 P.3d at 1003 n. 2 (citation omitted); see also WebBank, 2002 UT 88, \ 22, 54 P.3d at 
1145; Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108; Colonial Leasing Co. Of New England v. Larsen Bros. 
Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986). Indeed, when, as here, "contract 
interpretation will be determined by extrinsic evidence of intent, it becomes a question 
of fact." Records v. Brigss, 87 P.2d 864, 871 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also 
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Francisconi, 2001 UT App. 350, *h 14, 36 P.3d at 1003 n. 2 (concluding that, because 
there existed a dispute about material extrinsic evidence bearing on the scope of a policy 
that arguably modified the at-will relationship, there existed an issue of material fact). 
Therefore, it is clear that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to 
Summit on this issue. 
B. Even If Extrinsic Evidence Did Not Establish the Parties9 Original 
Intent, an Implied-In-Fact Contract Was Established That Required 
Summit To Pay Bonuses To Mr. Carvelas Beyond 2002. 
An employee has the burden of establishing the existence of an implied-in-fact 
contract provision. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1991); 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1044, 1052 (Utah 1989). To satisfy this 
burden, the employee must show that, although there was no express contract provision 
to this effect, the parties nevertheless expressed an intent to be bound to an agreement. 
Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1001; Berube, 111 P.2d at 1044, 1052. The existence of such an 
agreement is ordinarily a question of fact that turns on the objective manifestations of 
the parties' intent that is normally left to the jury. Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1001; Brehany 
v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 53-55 (Utah 1991); Berube, 111 P.2d at 1044, 1052. 
Mr. Carvelas has "the burden of establishing the existence of an implied-in-fact 
contract provision." Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1001. Specifically, Mr. Carvelas must show 
"a manifestation of the employer's intent that is communicated to the employee and 
sufficiently definite to operate as a contract provision." Kirberg v. West One Bank, 872 
P.2d 39, 41 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted) (quoted in Wood, 2001 UT App. 35, 
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f 14, 19 P.3d at 397. Oral statements and course of conduct may be used as evidence of 
Summit's intent to create an implied-in-fact provision. Wood, 2001 UT App. 35, | 14, 
19 P.3d at 397 (citing Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P..2d 331, 334 (Utah 1992)). 
"'In order for conduct and oral statements to establish an implied-in-fact contract, such 
evidence must be strong enough to overcome ... any inconsistent written policies and 
disclaimers."' Wood, 2001 UT App. 35, t 14, 19 P.3d at 397 (citing Hodgson, 844 P.2d 
at 334). 
In light of these principles, it is clear that a reasonable jury could conclude, based 
on oral statements made to Mr. Carvelas and the parties' course of conduct, that there 
existed an implied-in-fact contract that obligated Summit to continue to pay bonuses to 
Mr. Carvelas beyond 2002. Not only did Mr. La Haye represent to Mr. Carvelas, both 
while they were negotiating the Agreement and again in January 2003, that Summit 
would continue to pay him bonuses but, in 2003, Summit actually paid him a bonus 
equal to 20% of his base salary. 
Summit, for its part, may say that the Employment Agreement contains a clause 
that prohibits modification of the Agreement. Summit, though, would gain nothing by 
such an assertion. In fact, the Agreement states merely that "[a]ny waiver, modification, 
or amendment of any provision of this Agreement shall be effective only if in writing in 
a document that specifically refers to this Agreement and such document is signed by 
the parties hereto." Rec. at 96 (Employment Agreement at p. 9, ^ 12) (Addendum B). 
By contrast, the implied-in-fact contract that was created here addresses an issue as to 
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which the written Employment Agreement contains no provision at all but is entirely 
silent; and, as a consequence, that contract resulted in no waiver, modification or 
amendment of any provision of the Agreement. Consequently, a reasonable fact finder 
could conclude that the parties intended to enter into a subsequent agreement, following 
the payment of the last bonus to which the Employment Agreement specifically refers, 
for the continuation of bonuses based on the same terms as those set forth in the 
Agreement. See, e.g., Hodgson, 844 P.2d at 334; Brehany, 812 P.2d at 57; see also 
FrancisconU 2001 UT App. 350, | 14, 36 P.3d at 1003 (reversing district court's grant 
of summary judgment because there existed questions of material fact as to whether 
publication of policy created an implied-in-fact contract that modified at-will 
relationship); Wood, 2001 UT App. 35, ^ 14, 19 P.3d at 398 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) 
(reversing district court's grant of summary judgment as to one plaintiff because there 
existed a question of fact as to whether oral statements created an implied-in-fact 
contract that modified the at-will relationship). The District Court thus erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of Summit on the question whether Summit was obligated 
to pay Mr. Carvelas a bonus in 2004. 
III. A REASONABLE FINDER OF FACT COULD CONCLUDE THAT 
SUMMIT BREACHED ITS EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WITH 
MR, CARVELAS BY FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE 
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS TO WHICH THE PARTIES HAD 
AGREED. 
The District Court concluded that, by delivering a written notice to Mr. Carvelas 
stating that his employment with Summit was terminated "without cause/' Summit 
28 
adhered to the procedural requirements set forth in the Employment Agreement that 
required Summit to state the "grounds" for his termination. Rec. at 134-35 (Order at 
pp. 2-3, fflf 6, 11) (Addendum A). Yet, as we make clear below, Summit's tautological 
expression of the grounds or reason for Mr. Carvelas' termination fails to comply with 
the procedural requirements of their Employment Agreement. 
"Under Utah law, an employment relationship entered into for an indefinite 
period of time is presumed to be at-will and gives rise to a contractual arrangement 
where the employer or the employee may terminate the employment for any reason, 
except as provided by law." See Rackley v. Fairview Care Ctrs., Inc., 2001 UT 32, ^ 12, 
23 P.3d 1022, 1026 (Utah 2001) (citation omitted). An employee may overcome the 
presumption by showing there exists an express or implied agreement that employment 
may be terminated only "for cause" or upon some other agreed-upon condition. 
Rackley, 23 P.3d at 1026 (citations omitted); Francisconi, 2001 UT App. 350, f^ 11, 36 
P.3d at 1002 (citing Wood, 2001 UT App. 35, ^ 12, 19 P.3d 392 (Utah Ct. App. 2001)). 
As the Utah Supreme Court has made clear, "at will employment is a bundle of different 
privileges, any or all of which an employer can surrender ...." Sanderson v. First 
Security Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 307 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). In Sanderson, 
the Utah Supreme Court noted that, "in addition to a promise for a specified 
employment term or a for-cause requirement for termination, an employer can ... agree 
to use a certain procedure for firing employees or promise not to fire employees for a 
certain reason, thereby modifying the employee's at-will status." Id. at 307. 
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The privilege that Summit relinquished by operation of its Employment 
Agreement with Mr. Carvelas was the ability to terminate him without cause unless 
Summit provided, in its notice of termination, the reason or grounds for the termination. 
As the Employment Agreement makes clear, Summit could terminate Mr. Carvelas 
either for cause or, alternatively, without cause, but upon the satisfaction of that other 
agreed-upon condition - that Summit must state the "grounds," which Mr. Carvelas 
reasonably interprets as requiring a reason, for the termination, not merely repeating the 
fact that it was "without cause." See, e.g., Hodgson, 844 P.2d at 334-35 (concluding 
that, based on a discharge policy set forth in an employee handbook, an employee could 
have reasonably concluded that the employer was required to either provide fourteen 
days' notice or severance pay equivalent to fourteen days' earnings). 
Summit, for its part, asserted below (see Rec. at 44-45) that merely stating that a 
termination is "without cause" is sufficient to satisfy the requirement to state the 
"grounds" for the termination. In reaching the conclusion that Summit complied with 
the Agreement's procedural requirements, the District Court implicitly accepted this 
argument. 
The District Court's facile conclusion, however, ignores the import of the 
definition of "at will" employment. Indeed, "at will" employment, as defined by this 
Court and the Utah Supreme Court, "allows an employer to discharge an employee for 
any, or no, reason." Uintah Basin Medical Ctr. v. Hardy, 2005 UT App. 92, f 16, 110 
P.3d 168, 173 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Hansen v. America Online, Inc., 2004 UT 
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62, % 7, 96 P.3d 950 (Utah 2004)).2 By contrast, "termination for just cause is widely 
understood to permit discharge only for 'a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by 
good faith . . . as opposed to one that is trivial, capricious, unrelated to business needs or 
goals, or pretextual.'" Uintah Basin Medical Ctr., 2005 UT App. 92, If 16, 110 P.3d at 
173 (citation omitted). Thus, to state that a termination is "at will" or "without cause" 
does not, contrary to the District Court's conclusion here, tell us the grounds or reason 
for the termination, as required by the Employment Agreement here. As these 
definitions make clear, the provision at issue here did not go so far as to require a 
termination for "just cause," but, instead, simply required Summit to state the grounds or 
reason, however trivial, capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual it 
may have been. Accordingly, unlike the unmodified at will situation in which an 
employer is not required to state any reason but also unlike the situation in which a just 
cause provision requires a showing of good faith in making the decision, the provision 
here required Summit to state the grounds or reason but one that would be accepted at 
face value. See Uintah Basin Medical Ctr., 2005 UT App. 92, % 16, 110 P.3d at 173. 
The District Court's conclusion also ignores a fundamental principle of contract 
interpretation. The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that, "[i]n interpreting a 
2
 The April 6, 2005 letter from Summit notifying Mr. Carvelas of his termination 
repeats this definition, recognizing that the "at will" nature of Mr. Carvelas' employment 
means that Summit had the ability to terminate Mr. Carvelas "for any reason, with or 
without cause." In so doing, the letter also recognizes, implicitly, that stating the reason or 
grounds for a termination is not the same as stating that a termination is "at will" or 
"without cause." 
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contract, "'we look to the writing itself to ascertain the parties' intentions, and we 
consider each contract provision ... in relation to all of the others, with a view toward 
giving effect to all and ignoring none." WebBank, 2002 UT 88, f 18, 54 P.3d at 1145 
(quoting Jones v. ERA Brokers Console 200 UT 61, fl2, 6 P.3d 1129, 1131 (Utah 2000) 
(further citations omitted)); see also Cent. Fla. Invests., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 
UT 3, Tf 12, 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002). Here, the Defendant's proffered interpretation -
which removes the distinct requirement to state a "grounds therefore" by equating the 
requirement to state the grounds for a termination with stating merely that the 
termination was without cause - runs afoul of this well-established principle. 
This result does not, as the Defendant asserted below (see Rec. at 45) create an 
irreconcilable conflict between the ability of Summit to terminate without cause and the 
requirement to state the grounds for the termination. To the contrary, Summit still 
possesses the ability to terminate without cause, provided that, in so doing, it merely 
states the reason for the termination. See, e.g., Sanderson, 844 P.2d at 307-08 (reversing 
the grant of summary judgment on the plaintiffs claim for breach of an implied contract 
that the employee would not be terminated for illness-induced absences). 
Given all of this, summary judgment on the question whether Summit complied 
with the procedural requirements of the parties' Employment Agreement is 
inappropriate. Although Mr. Carvelas thus interprets the contractual language as having 
only the meaning he ascribes to it, the Defendant's contrary position, even assuming 
arguendo that its strained interpretation has any force, establishes only that the language 
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is ambiguous. R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1074. Again, taking the facts in a light most 
favorable to the Mr. Carvelas and drawing all justifiable inferences in his favor, as we 
again must, it is clear that there exist issues of fact. Id; Webb, 804 P.2d at 551-52. 
Therefore, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Summit on 
this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee Summit 
was erroneous. Each of Mr. Carvelas' claims presents genuine issues of material fact 
that preclude summary judgment and require resolution by a finder of fact. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Gregory W. Stevens 
Dated: March 13, 2006 Attorney for Appellant 
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1 hereby certify that, this 13th day of Mach 2006, I served two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellants, including all addenda, by first class mail, postage 
prepaid, on the following counsel: 
Attorneys for the Appellee: 
John A. Beckstead, Esquire 
Snell & Wilmer 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004 
Gregory W. Stevens 
ADDENDUM A 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
Case No. 050909568 (Nov. 29, 2005) 
By. 
'«~ c-„.ac:U District 
^ V ' 2 9 2005 
Deputy b ^ | 
John A. Beclcstead (0263) 
David P. Williams (7346) 
Snell & Wilmer LLP 
3 5 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendant Summit Financial 
Resources, L.P. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD J. CARVELAS 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SUMMIT FINANCIAL RESOURCES, 
L.P., 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW & ORDER 
Case No. 050909568 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
This matter came before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant, 
Summit Financial Resources. L.P. ("Summit Financial"). Oral argument was heard by the Court 
on October 25, 2005. Gregory W. Stevens appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, Donald J. 
Carvelas ("Mr. Carvelas"), and David P. Williams appeared on behalf of Summit Financial. 
Havmg reviewed the pleadings and having heard oral argument of counsel, the Court entered a 
ailing dated November 1, 2005, granting Summit Financial's motion, and directing its counsel to 
prepare an order. 
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BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, the Court enters the following findings, conclusions, 
and order: 
1. Summit Financial entered into a contract of employment with Mr. Carvelas on or 
about September 15, 1999 (the "Contract"). 
2. The Contract provides that Mr. Carvelas' Employment was "at-will," and that he 
could be terminated without cause. 
3. The Contract contemplated the payment of performance bonuses for the years 
1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002, contingent upon Mr. Carvelas meeting certain goals and objcclivcs. 
4. For the year 2000, the Chief Executive Officer deteimmed that no employee, 
including Mr Carvelas, fully met their individual and collective goals and expectations, and so 
Summit Financial paid only partial bonuses, including a reduced bonus of 7.5% of base salary to 
Mr. Carvelas. 
5. For the year 2001, the Chief Executive Officer determined that no employee, 
including Mr. Carvelas, had met their individual and collective goals and objectives, and 
therefore Summit Financial paid no bonuses. 
6. On April 6, 2005, Summit Financial terminated Mr. Carvelas5 employment by 
delivering written notice thereof to Mr. Carvelas, and statin si to Mr Carvelas that his termination 
was '"without cause/7 pursuant to the terms of the Contract. 
7. The Contract is clear and unambiguous, both as to bonuses and termination of 
employment. 
8. Whether or not Mr. Carvelas met the goals and objectives of his employment was 
373725 I 2 
within the sole discretion of the Chief Executive Officer. 
9. The fact claimed by Mr. Carvelas that he was never advised of any goals or 
objectives is immaterial given the clear and unambiguous terms of the contract. 
10. The Contract provides for no bonuses after December 2002, and there is no 
ambiguity in that language. 
11. Plaintiff agreed that he could be terminated without cause. There is no ambiguity 
in the terms and conditions of the Contract, and Summit Financial temiinated Mr. Carvelas 
without cause, specifying its basis as being without cause. 
12. Summit Financial did not breach its obligations under the Contract. 
ORDER 
WHEREFOR, having found no breach, the Court orders that defendant's Motion for 
Summary judgment is granted, and plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed with prejudice, 
DATED this 7f\ day of November, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM B 
Employment Agreement dated Sept. 15,1999 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS g^LOYMENTAGREEMENT (the "Agreement) is entered 
into as of&grlrel J£, 1 9 9 9 , ^ "Effective Date") by and between 
ALTRES FINANCIAL, LP. a Hawaii limited partnership (the "Company") 
and Donald J, Carvelas (the "Employee"). 
In consideration of the promises and mutual covenants contained 
herein, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Employment Location 
The Company hereby employs Employee and Employee hereby 
accepts such employment in Salt Lake City, Utah or in such other location as 
may be mutually agreed upon between the parties. 
2. Employment At Will 
The Company agrees to employ Employee and Employee agrees to 
accept employment with ike Company on an "at will" basis. The Employee 
acknowledges that the Company may terminate his employment for any 
reason at any time, subject to the requirements of subparagraphs 6.2, 6.3, 
and 6.4 below to the extent that those provisions are applicable to the 
Employee's termination. 
3. Pjitiej 
Employee shall be the Vice President, Underwriting, of the Company. 
Employee shall diligently execute such duties and shall devote his full-time 
skills and efforts to such duties during ordinary working hours. Employee 
shall be responsible for performing his duties in compliance with the 
accountabilities in the Job Description set forth in Exhibit A and for 
accomplishing the annual Performance Goals and Objectives set forth in 
Exhibit B, attached hereto respectively. Employee acknowledges that such 
Goals and Objectives are subject to annual review, modification, and 
amendment in the discretion of the Chief Executive Officer to reflect 
changes in performance criteria, and that such updated Goals and Objectives 
shall constitute a part of this Agreement. 
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Employee shall report to, and perform all duties subject to the general 
supervision and control of, the Chief Executive Officer, who shall have the 
power to make all determinations required by or pursuant to this Contract. 
4. Compensation and Benefits 
The Company shall pay Employee, and the Employee shall accept as 
full compensation for all services to be rendered to the Company under this 
Agreement, the following compensation and benefits: 
4. J Salary, The Company shall pay Employee an annual salary of 
Eighty Five Thousand Dollars ($85,000). Such salary shall be 
payable in equal installments, at least monthly on the last day of 
each month or at more frequent intervals in accordance with the 
Company's customary pay schedule, subject to such increases 
as the Chief Executive Officer may determine to award from 
time to time in his sole discretion. 
4.2 Bonus. Upon execution of this agreement the Employee will be QA/ 
paid a one time bonus of Twelve Thousand Dollars ($ I IfiOtff. ft 
Based upon the Employee's completion of all or substantially 
all of the Annual Performance Objectives as determined by the 
Company's Chief Executive Officer and as set forth in Exhibit 
B as they may be revised, modified or amended pursuant to 
Paragraph 3 above, the Employee shall accrue an annual bonus 
in the amount of (1) Ten Percent (10%) of his base salary for 
the period ending December 31,1999 on a prorata basis; (2) 
Fifteen Percent (15%) of his base salary for the period ending 
December 31,2000; (3) Twenty Percent (20%) of his base 
salary for the period ending December 31,2001; and 
(4) Twenty Percent (20%) of his base salary for the period 
ending December 31,2002. Payment of annual bonus 
compensation to the Employee will be made not later than 
April \S^ of the fiscal year following each bonus period. 
4.3 Additional Benefits. Employee shall be eligible to participate 
in the Company's other employee benefits plans, if and when 
such plans may be adopted, including merit bonus plans, 
pension or profit sharing plans, and those plans covering life, 
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disability, health, and dental insurance in accordance with the 
rules established in the discretion of the Management 
Committee for individual participation in any such plans as may 
be in effect from time to time. 
4.4 Performance l/nfo Plan Participation. 
Employee shall be entitled to participate fully in the Company's 
Performance Units Plan (the "Plan"), established etfective 
January 1,1999, attached hereto as Exhibit C and incorporated 
herein by reference. The provisions of the Plan and any 
subsequent amendments thereto are fully applicable to this 
subparagraph unless otherwise stated herein. 
As of the Effective date of this Agreement, the Employee shall 
be granted Five Thousand (5,000) Performance Units (as 
defined in the Plan and any amendments thereto). At the 
conclusion of fiscal years 2000,2001 and 2002, the Employee 
shall be granted an additional Five Thousand (5,000) 
Performance Units for each year of employment which qualifies 
as a "Targeted Year of Service" as defined in the Plan, provided 
all or substantially all of the Annual Performance Objectives for 
the Target Year of Service are completed. Notwithstanding the 
requirements of Section 3.03, Employee will be 100% vested in 
granted Participation Units upon their issuance. In the event 
Performance Objectives are not met in any Target Year of 
Service and Performance Units are not awarded, such 
Performance Units will not be forfeited. Such Performance 
Units will be awarded, if earned, over the remaining years of 
the term of the Agreement in equal amounts. Employee is 
entitled under this Agreement to no more than the Twenty 
Thousand (20,000) Performance Units but the Company may 
elect, in its sole discretion, to award additional Performance 
Units under such conditions as it deems appropriate. 
Notwithstanding the vesting provisions of Paragraph 3.03 of the 
Plan, and for the purposes of this Employment Agreement 
alone, Performance Units shall vest filly for the purposes of 
Paragraphs 4.01 and 4.02 of the Plan at the time the 
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Performance Units are granted to Employee, subject to the 
forfeiture provisions of Paragraph 4.03 as modified below. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 4.03 of the Plan, 
and for the purposes of this Employment Agreement alone, 
Employer agrees that it will not require Employee to forfeit 
vested or unvested Performance Units in the event Employee is 
terminated for "cause" subsequent to the third anniversary of 
employment under this Agreement. Employer expressly 
reserves the right to require forfeiture of, and Employee shall 
immediately forfeit, vested or unvested Performance Units if 
Employee is terminated for cause prior to such third 
anniversary of employment as defined in Paragraph 6.02 
subparagraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) of the Agreement, 
exclusively. 
Notwithstanding the forfeiture provisions of Paragraph 4.03 of 
the Plan, and for the purposes of this Employment Agreement 
alone, Employer and Employee further agree that Employer 
shall have the right to require forfeiture of, and Employee shall 
immediately forfeit, all vested and unvested Performance Units 
in the event that Employee elects to terminate this Agreement 
pursuant to Paragraph 6.1 below prior to third anniversary of 
employment. 
Vacation. Sick Leave, and Holidays. Employee shall be 
entitled to an aggregate of up to 15 days of leave for vacation 
each calendar year during the term of the Agreement at full pay. 
Employee may not accumulate vacation days in excess of 15 
days. The Company will pay Employee for all accrued unused 
vacation time at the time of termination of employment. Upon 
termination, the Company will pay Employee for a maximum 
of 15 days of unused vacation. 
Deductions. The Company shall have the right to deduct from 
any Compensation due to the Employee hereunder any and all 
sums required for social security and withholding taxes and for 
any other federal, state, or local taxes or charges which may be 
hereafter enacted or required by law as charge on the 
compensation of Employee. 
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5. Business Expenses 
The Company shall promptly reimburse Employee for all reasonable 
out-of-pocket business expenses he incurs in fulfilling his duties 
hereunder, in accordance with the general policies of the Company in 
effect from time to time, provided that Employee furnishes to the 
Company adequate records and other documentary evidence required 
by all federal and state statutes and regulations issues by the 
appropriate taxing authorities for the substantiation of such business 
expenses as a deduction on the federal or state tax returns of the 
Company. 
6. Termination 
6.1 Termination bv Employee. This Agreement and Employee's 
employment hereunder shall terminate upon written notice from 
Employee to the Company, including a statement to the 
Employer of the grounds therefore. This Agreement shall also 
terminate upon Employee's death. Employee or his 
representative shall be entitled to compensation and benefits to 
the date of termination of employment unless otherwise 
provided herein. Employee shall not be entitled to any 
severance payments, 
6.2 Termination of Employee for Cause. This Agreement and 
Employee's employment hereunder is immediately terminable 
for "cause0 (as defined below) upon written notice from the 
Company to the Employee, which notice shall contain a 
statement of the grounds therefore. Any notice under this 
subparagraph shall also be given to any beneficiary of any 
benefit provided by the Company pursuant to this Agreement, 
provided that the Company has received written notice of the 
identity, status, and address of such other beneficiary. 
As used in this Agreement, ''cause" shall include; (1) habitual 
neglect of, or deliberate or intentional refusal to perform, his 
duties and obligations under this Agreement, (2) fraudulent or 
criminal activities, (3) any grossly negligent or unethical 
activity, (4) any activity that causes substantial harm to the 
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Company, its reputation, or its directors or employees, or 
(5) failure to meet, comply with, and accomplish the annual 
Performance Goals and Objectives set forth in Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto. Employee acknowledges that such Goals and 
Objectives are subject to annual review, modification, and 
amendment in the discretion of the Chief Executive Officer to 
reflect changes in performance criteria. A determination of 
whether Employee's actions justify termination for cause and 
the date on which such termination is effective shall be made by 
the Company's Management Committee in its sole discretion. 
In the event Employee's employment is terminated for "cause", 
Employee shall be entitled only to compensation and benefits 
due as of the date of termination of the employment unless 
otherwise provided herein. Employee shall not be entitled to 
any severance payments. 
6.3 Termination of Employee without Cause. The Company may 
tenninate Employee other than for "cause" upon written notice 
to the Employee. Such notice shall contain a statement of the 
grounds therefore. Any notice under this subparagraph shall 
also be given to any beneficiary of any benefit provided by the 
Company pursuant to this Agreement, provided that the 
Company has received written notice of the identity, status, and 
address of such other beneficiary. 
6.4 Termination for Disability. The Company may tenninate this 
Agreement for any disability (as defined below) of the 
Employee at the expiration of a three (3) consecutive month 
period of disability if the Company determines, in its sole 
discretion, that Employee's condition or disability will prevent 
him from substantially performing his essential duties 
hereunder. As used in this Agreement, "disability" shall be 
defined as (1) Employee's inability, by reason of physical or 
mental illness or other cause, substantially to perform his 
essential duties hereunder, or (2) in the discretion of the 
Company, as that term is defined in any disability insurance 
policy in effect at the Company during the time in question. 
Employee shall receive full compensation, benefits, and 
reimbursement of expenses pursuant to Paragraphs 4 and 5 
above from the date the disability begins until the date he 
6 
receives written notice of termination and the grounds therefore 
under this subparagraph or until Employee begins to receive 
disability benefits pursuant to a Company disability insurance 
policy, whichever occurs first. 
6.5 Effect of Termination. In the event that Employee's 
employment is terminated hereunder, all obligations of the 
Company and all obligations of Employee shall cease except as 
provided in Paragraph 4.4 above and Paragraphs 6.3, 7 and 8 
below. Upon such termination, Employee, his representatives, 
or his estate shall be entitled to receive only the compensation, 
benefits, and reimbursements earned or accrued by him under 
Paragraphs 4 and 5 above prior to date of termination, 
computed pro rata up to and including the date of termination. 
Employee shall not be entitled to any further compensation, 
benefits, or reimbursement following such date, except as 
specifically provided in Paragraphs 4.4 and 6.3 above. 
7. Non-solicitation 
7.1 Covenant. Employee hereby agrees that, while employed by 
the Company pursuant to this Agreement, and during the 
12-month period following the termination of employment 
hereunder, Employee will nof directly or indirectly induce, 
request or advise any person or entity to withdraw, curtail, or 
cancel that person's or entity's business or prospective business 
with the Company. Employee agrees that, while employed by 
the Company pursuant to this Agreement, and during the 
6-month period following the termination of employment 
hereunder, Employee will not directly or indirectly solicit or 
induce any employee of the Company to leave the employ of 
the Company. 
7.2 Enforceability. If any of the provisions of this Section 7 is held 
unenforceable, the remaining provisions shall nevertheless 
remain enforceable, and the court making such determination 
shall modify, among other things, the scope or duration of this 
Section 7 to preserve the enforceability hereof to the maximum 
extent then permitted by law. In addition, the enforceability of 
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this Section 7 is also subject to the injunctive and other 
equitable powers of a court as described in Section 10 below 
8. Confidential Information 
Employee acknowledges that during his employment with the 
Company, Employee will develop, discover, have access to, and become 
acquainted with technical, financial, marketing, customers, prospective 
customers, personnel, and other information relating to the present or 
contemplated products or the conduct of business of the Company which is 
of a confidential and proprietary nature ("Confidential Information"). 
Employee agrees that all files, records, documents, and the like relating to 
such Confidential Information, whether prepared by him or otherwise 
coming into his possession, shall remain the exclusive property of the 
Company, and Employee hereby agrees to promptly discJose such 
Confidential Information to the Company upon request and hereby assigns 
to the Company any rights which he may acquire in any Confidential 
Information. Employee further agrees not to disclose or use any 
Confidential Information and to use his best efforts to prevent the disclosure 
oi use of any Confidential Information either during the term of his 
employment or at any time thereafter, except as may be necessary in the 
ordinary course of performing his duti&s under this Agreement. Upon 
termination of Employee's employment with the Company for any reason, 
Employee shall promptly deliver to the Company all materials, documents, 
data, equipment, and other physical property of any nature containing or 
pertaining to any Confidential Information, and Employee shall not take 
from the Company's premises any such material or equipment or any 
reproduction thereof. 
9. No Conflicts 
Employee hereby represents that, to the best of his knowledge, his 
performance of all terms of this Agreement and his work as an Employee of 
the Company does not breach any oral or written agreement which the 
employee has made prior to his employment with the Company. 
10. Equitable Remedies 
Employee acknowledges and agrees that the breach or threatened 
breach by him of certain provisions of this Agreement, including without 
limitations Sections 7 and 8 above, would cause irreparable harm to the 
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Company for which damages at law would be an inadequate remedy. 
Accordingly, Employee hereby agrees that in any such instance the 
Company shall be entitled to seek injunctive or other equitable relief in 
addition to any other remedy to which it may be entitled. 
11. Assignment 
This Agreement is for the unique personal services of Employee and 
is not assignable or delegable in whole or in part by Employee without the 
consent of the Management Committee of the Company. This Agreement 
may be assigned or delegated in whole or in part by the Company and, in 
such case, the terms of this Agreement shall inure to the benefit of, be 
assumed by, and be binding upon the entity to which this Agreement is 
assigned. 
12. Waiver or Modification 
Any waiver, modification, or amendment of any provision of this 
Agreement shall be effective only if in writing in a document that 
specifically refers to this Agreement and such document is signed by the 
parties hereto. 
13. Entire Agreement 
This Agreement constitutes the full and complete understanding and 
agreement of the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter covered 
herein and supersedes all prior oral or written understandings and 
agreements with respect thereto. 
14. Severability 
If any provision of this Agreement is found to be unenforceable by a 
court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining provisions shall nevertheless 
remain in full force and effect. 
15. Notices 
Any notice required hereunder to be given by either party shall be in 
writing and shall be delivered personally or sent by certified or registered 
mail, postage prepaid, or by private courier, with written verification of 
delivery, or by facsimile transmission to the other party to the address or 
telephone number set forth below or to such other address or telephone 
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number as either party may designate from time to time according to this 
provision. A notice delivered personally shall be effecrive upon receipt. A 
notice sent by facsimile transmission shall be effective twenty-four hours 
after the dispatch thereof. A notice delivered by mail or by private courier 
shall be effective on the next business day following the day of mailing. 
(a) To Employee at; 11627 Chenault Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90049 
(b) To the Company at: Altres Financial, LP. 
2323 S. Foothill Blvd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
16. Qpye, mjqg law 
This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Employee has signed this Agreement 
personally and the Company has caused this Agreement to be executed by 
its duly authorized representative. 




POSITION: Vice President, Underwriting 
POSITION 
SUMMARY: Responsible for analysis, structuring and due diligence process 
related to the underwriting of all factoring transactions 
Responsible for the timely processing of all factoring transactions 
from receipt of Term Sheet from Client through the preparation, 
negotiation and execution of legal documentation 
REPORTING 
RELATIONSHIP: Chief Executive Officer 
MAJOR ACCOUNTABILITIES: 
• Ensure underwriting process is consistent, responsive and that processing times 
meet established objectives. Standard procedures detailing the specific activities 
and tasks related to the underwriting process are to be created and revised on an 
as needed basis; 
• Maintain the communication process with business development officers at a 
level which will ensure continuity and consistency in the transfer of information 
to the customer during the underwriting process; 
• Maintain an interna) communication process with appropriate operations staff 
members that will ensure an efficient and timely underwriting, documentation 
and funding process which meets the needs of the customer and the company 
• Perform a level of analysis and due diligence on factoring transactions that is 
appropriate to the dollar amount and risks associated with the transaction; 
• Maintain responsibility for scheduling survey audits on all prospective clients, as 
needed. 
i Ensure that the underwriting and due diligence process related to factoring 
transactions are submitted to the company's Credit Committee in a written form 
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with sufficient information to allow for a decision to approve or reject the 
transaction baaed upon the facta of the underwriting results. Recommendations 
est to be clearly stated, including comments related to en appropriate leve) of 
ongoing account management 
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EXHffiTLB 
The following goals and objectives are set for the performance of 
Donald J, Carvelas ("Employee") in the capacity of Vice President, 
Underwriting of ALTRES Financial, LP. ("Company") 
The successful completion of all or substantially all of these terms 
will entitle the Employee to receive a cash bonus equal to Ten Percent (10%) 
of Employee's base pay to be payable not later than April 15,2000. 
The Company's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") or designee will 
conduct a formal review of Employee's performance on or before 
January 31,2000. In the event this review does not take place by January 31, 
2000, Employee will be deemed to have successfully completed all or 
substantially all of the required goals and objectives. 
In the event Employee does not achieve all or substantially all the 
goals and objectives, the CEO or designee may reduce the percentage of the 
cash bonus paid to the Employee. 
Qoaig Md Objectives 
To be determined and mutually agreed upon not later than August 31,1999. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Affidavit of Gordon G. LaHaye dated July 27, 2005 
John A. Beckstead (0263) 
David P. Williams (7346) 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendant Summit Financial 
Resources, L.P. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
[AFFIDAVIT OF GORDON G. LA HA YE IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
DONALD J. CARVELAS 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
SUMMIT FINANCIAL RESOURCES, 
L.P., 
Defendant. 
Case No. 050909568 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Gordon G. La Haye, being first duly sworn, deposes and says under oath: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years, and I have personal knowledge of the 
matters stated herein, and I am in all respects competent to make this affidavit. 
2. I am the Chief Executive Officer of Summit Financial Resources, L.P. ("Summit 
Financial"), a financial services company providing financing solutions to businesses and 
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defendant in the above-captioned matter. 
3. Pursuant to the terms of the Employment Agreement between Summit Financial 
and Plaintiff Don Carvelas (the "Employment Agreement"), Summit Financial paid Mr. Carvelas 
a full bonus for 1999 based in part upon its failure to hold a formal employee evaluation prior to 
January 31, 2000. 
4. For the year 2000, it was determined that no employee, including Mr. Carvelas, 
fully met their individual and collective goals and expectations, and so Summit Financial paid 
only partial bonuses, including a reduced bonus of 7.5% of base salary to Mr. Carvelas. 
5. For the year 2001, it was determined that no employee, including Mr. Carvelas, 
had met their individual and collective goals and objectives, and therefore Summit Financial paid 
no bonuses. 
6. Plaintiff understood at the time that he would not be receiving full/partial bonuses 
for 2000 and 2001 and never voiced any concerns to me. 
Dated this 11 day of July. 2005. 
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Being first duly sworn, Gordon G. La Haye appeared before me on July 
averred the truth of the foregoing and executed this instrument to acknowledge the same. 
2005, 
(Signature of notarial officer) 
(Seal, if any) 
My Commission Expires 
Notary Public 
TRACIE REYNOLDS 
2455 E.J»*rteys Way SuKe 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah $4109 
My Commission Expires 
April 28,2009 
State of Utah 
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ADDENDUM D 
Affidavit of Donald J. Carvelas dated Aug. 16,2005 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD J. CARVELAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SUMMIT FINANCIAL RESOURCES, L.P., 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD J. CARVELAS 
Case No. 050909568 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF X ^ ,r~ 
ss: 
I, Donald J. Carvelas, having been duly sworn, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that 
the following is true and correct: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-captioned civil action, over the age of 21 and competent to 
make this Affidavit. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Affidavit. 
2. I began my employment with the Defendant in this civil action, Summit Financial 
Resources, L.P. ("Summit'5), previously known as Altres Financial, L.P., as a Vice President, Senior 
Underwriter, and a member of Summit's management team in Salt Lake City, on or about 
September 15,1999, and was terminated from my employment by Summit on or about April 6,2005. 
3. A true and correct copy of my Employment Agreement with Summit, dated February 15, 
1999, is attached to my Memorandum In Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
including Exhibits A and B to the Agreement, as Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
4. During the entire tenure of my employment with Summit, no one at Summit ever 
conducted a formal review of my performance, ever informed me of any modification to the 
performance goals and objectives stated in Exliibit B of the Employment Agreement, or ever, to the 
best of my knowledge, actually established specific performance goals and objectives for me or 
actually compared my performance to any such performance goals and objectives. 
5. I also never received any form of communication from Mr. La Haye stating that Summit 
would be paying only partial bonuses for any year; I asked Mr. La Haye, both orally and by email, 
why I did not receive a full bonus in 2000 and 2001, and Mr. La Haye never responded to my request. 
6. Just before I was hired by Summit during or around September 1999, while I was 
discussing the terms of the Employment Agreement with Gordon G. La Haye, the Chief Executive 
Officer of Summit and, in particular, the bonus provisions of the Agreement, Mr. La Haye told me 
that the bonuses would continue to be paid to management staff, including me, beyond 2002 based on 
the requirements set forth in the Agreement and applying the same method to calculate the bonus as 
the method used in 2002. 
7. Based on this discussion, I understood, at the time I entered into the Employment 
Agreement with Summit, that Summit would continue, beyond 2002, to pay bonuses based on the 
requirements set forth in the Employment Agreement and arriving at the bonuses in the same way 
that Summit arrived at the bonuses paid for 2002. 
8. I received a bonus equal to 20% of my base salary for the year 2002. During that year, I 
was also never given a formal review or notice of any performance goals and objectives that applied 
tome. 
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9. During January 2003, Mr. La Haye also represented to me that, after 2002, about which 
the Employment Agreement is silent with respect to the payment of bonuses, Summit would continue 
to pay me annual bonuses based on the percentage applicable to the year 2002. 
10. This representation confirmed my understanding that Summit would continue to pay 
bonuses to me equal to 20% of my base salary for each year of my employment following 2002. 
11. Summit did in fact pay me a bonus equal to 20% of my base salary for the year 2003. 
During that year, I was also never given a formal review or notice of any performance goals and 
objectives that applied to me. 
12. The payment of the bonus at that rate for 2003 again confirmed to me that Summit would 
continue to pay annual bonuses for each year of my employment at the same rate as the rate 
established in the Employment Agreement for the year 2002. 
13. During a meeting among Mr. La Haye, Doug Keefe, Summit's Chief Financial Officer, 
and me that occurred on April 6,2005, Mr. La Haye told me that, if I did not resign, my employment 
would be terminated, I declined to resign, and Mr. La Haye informed me that my employment was 
being terminated without cause. 
14. During that meeting, I asked Mr. La Haye a number of times why I was being terminated 
and his response, each time I asked, was that my employment was at will and, under Utah law, he did 
not need to give me a reason. 
15.1 returned to my office, along with Mr. Keefe, Mr. Keefe gave me an envelope containing 
a letter dated April 6, 2005 notifying me of my termination, and Mr. Keefe informed me that my 
termination was without cause and that there were absolutely no performance issues or wrongdoing 
of any kind being claimed by Summit. A true and correct copy of the letter is attached to my 
Memorandum In Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. 
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16. During that conversation, Mr. Keefe asked me for the keys to my office, said that my 
personal belongings would be packed up, and added that those items would either be sent to my 
apartment or I could stop by the office and get them. Based on this discussion, and the fact that I was 
being notified that I was terminated, I understood that, though Summit failed to provide a reason for 
my termination, I was no longer employed by Summit and could not return to work. 
Executed this / 7 ^day of August 2005. 
Donald J. Carvel; 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this j Q _ daY o f August 2005, by Donald J. 
Carvelas. 
m i n + m m 
JOHN SUTLER 
NotayPubHc 
State of Utah 
My Comm. Expire* Feb 18, 2009 




Letter from G. LaHaye to D. Carvelas dated April 6, 2005 
SuiMivirr 
F I N A N C I A L 
R E S O U R C E S 
April 6. 2005 
Don Girvelas 
900 Bitncr Rd 
F3I 
Park City. UT 840% 
Doir 
You JIC heicby notified that your employment with Summit I'iniincinl Resources, I P is 
terminated effective immediately. Voui Fmployment Agreement (luted September 15, 1999 and 
the Summit l-muncial Resources. L P. Employee Policy Manual (Revised 2004) prov/de that 
your employment is "at will" and may be terminated for any reason, with or without cause, at 
any time The company is therefore exercising is> i ighi to terminate you without cause 
Our Human Resources personnel will advise you on compensation, termination of 
benefits und exit procedures 
Summit Financial Resources, LP. 
^•-fcfesfflcHl & CEO 
